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Abstract: We extend the evidence on the Halloween effect (returns during the months of May to October tend to be 
lower than returns during the months of November to April) in stock markets by examining the return pattern of 145 
European Equity Mutual Funds from 1997 to 2013. The main purpose is to investigate if previously predictabilities in 
equity stock markets returns are reflected in mutual funds. We conclude that (i) the Halloween effect is statistically and 
economically significant; (ii) this effect has disappeared after the Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) publication; (iii) an 
investment strategy based on this anomaly clearly beats the buy-and-hold strategy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH, hereafter) 
has over a century of history, being introduced firstly by 
Bachelier in 1900 and formally presented by Eugene 
Fama in the 1960s and 1970s. In spite of its 
widespread acceptance, the efficient markets’ theory 
was firstly questioned during the 1990s when a few 
patterns and seasonal effects, also called “anomalies” 
or “calendar effects”, have been identified in the 
behaviour of stock prices. The ones commonly tested 
are the Day-of-the-week effect (especially Monday and 
Friday; Mazumbder, Chu, Miller & Prather (2008), 
Tsiakas (2006) and Tong (200)), January effect (Beladi, 
Chao & Hu (2016b), Lucey & Zhao (2008), Hawawini & 
Keim (2000) and Canestrelli & Ziemba (2000)), Holiday 
effect (Hong & Yu (2009)), Christmas effect (Beladi, 
Chao & Hu (2016a)) and, more recently, the Halloween 
effect. Even if the EMH does not exclude the possibility 
of anomalies in the market, and if explored could result 
in higher profits, the investment strategies based on 
these patterns cannot be frequent and consistent over 
time. Therefore, the question remains nowadays, can 
we trust the stock markets are efficient? 
A first important contribution to the “Halloween 
Effect” (or “Halloween Indicator”) was given by Bouman 
& Jacobsen (2002) by testing the veracity of the old 
market wisdom “Sell in May and go away”. Using the 
monthly stock returns of 37 countries, including 
developed and emerging markets, from January 1970 
to August 1998, they found that average returns for the 
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period November-April in 36 countries are higher than 
for the period May-October. Moreover, average returns 
during the period May-October are not statistically 
different from zero and are often negative. At the 10 
percent significance level, they found statistical 
evidence of a strong Sell in May effect in 20 stock 
markets, and particularly strong and statistically 
significant in European countries. They also showed 
that this could not be explained by factors such as the 
January effect, data mining, changes in interest rates 
and volume and the provision of news. This seasonal 
pattern questions the EMH mainly because it has been 
known for quite a time and seems to persist in stock 
markets. 
After the Bouman & Jacobsen (2002) empirical 
evidence, the investigations directed mainly to three 
topics. First, which are the reasons for the higher 
average return in winter and spring time? Second, new 
empirical evidence was needed against the Halloween 
effect before and after the Bouman and Jacobsen 
(2002) paper, insisting on stock markets’ efficiency. 
Finally, studies to confirm that the effect remains 
pointing to the conclusion that stock markets are not 
efficient. 
Kamstra, Kramer & Levi (2003) suggest a possible 
explanation for the Halloween effect. They have 
documented a similar pattern in stock returns and 
explain it as a seasonal affective disorder (SAD) effect 
in stock returns.1 They believe that the decreasing 
hours of daylight during fall makes investors 
                                            
1 SAD is a medical condition whereby the shortness of days leads to 
depression for many people. 
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depressed, leading to higher risk aversion. Stock 
returns are lower during the fall and then become 
relatively higher during the winter months, when days 
start getting longer (after the winter solstice). Based on 
stock market index data from countries at various 
latitudes and both sides of the Equator, the authors 
found strong evidence that supports the existence of an 
important effect of SAD on stock market returns around 
the world. Some authors believe that Kamstra et al. 
(2003) arguments are not consistent. If they think that 
the seasonal effect is related to the length of the day, 
then we expect returns during the spring and summer 
months, when days are longer, to be higher rather than 
in winter months. 
There are other authors who also suggest that the 
SAD explanation for the Halloween effect is not 
reliable. Jacobsen & Marquering (2008) confirmed that 
there was a strong seasonal effect on stock markets 
returns for several countries, where returns tend to be 
lower in summer than in winter time. They mentioned 
that the correlation between weather and stock returns 
would be just data-driven and therefore not a potential 
explanation for the anomaly. Additionally, they also 
suggested that the SAD argument is not a strong one 
for countries near the Equator. Kelly & Meschke 
(2010), based on a more psychological approach, 
mentioned that the SAD hypothesis is not supported by 
the psychological literature, as the seasonal patterns 
for the SAD presented by Kamstra et al. (2003) do not 
match the general patterns found in depression. 
The effect was also studied by Doeswijk (2008) but 
on a global perspective, with stock markets returns 
being measured by the MSCI World index and 
analysed for the 1970-2003 period. He found that 
returns from May through September tend to be 
negative or close to zero and those differences in 
average returns between November-April and May-
October periods are about 7.5%, in the 1970-1986 
range and 7.7% for 1987-2003. Doeswijk (2008) 
suggests that the anomaly could result from an optimist 
cycle, saying that investors think in calendar years, 
instead of twelve rolling months, and at the beginning 
of the year they are too optimistic about market growth 
and earnings. After the summer break, investors 
become more pessimistic and during the last quarter of 
the year, they start looking forward to the next calendar 
year. 
In spite of the reasons, several authors insist on the 
Halloween non-efficiency anomaly. Jacobsen, Mamun 
& Visaltanachoti (2005) highlight that the Halloween 
effect is a market-wide phenomenon, as they found it is 
not related to the January effect, either to portfolio 
value, earning price ratios and cash flow price ratios. 
Bohl and Salm (2010) also investigated the predictive 
power of stock market returns in January for the 
subsequent 11 months’ returns across 19 countries. As 
only 2 out of 19 countries’ stock markets exhibit a 
robust January effect they conclude that the January 
effect is not an international phenomenon. 
Moskalenko & Reichling (2008) analysed whether a 
summer break was detected in the Russian stock 
market. They analyzed the RTS index from 1995 to 
2006 and concluded that the September-to-May 
strategy seemed to perform best amongst stock 
investments with a duration of eight months, identifying 
the best month to exit the market as May, supporting 
the “Sell in May and go away” theory, and that the best 
entry time was September. Moreover, they saw that the 
advantage of this strategy is primarily due to market 
entry time at the end of September, and secondly 
because of the exit time in May. In their study on U.S. 
equity sectors in the period 1926-2006, Jacobsen & 
Visaltanachoti (2009) found that 48 out of 49 industries 
perform better during the winter when compared to the 
summer. The authors define an investment strategy 
(sector rotating strategy) that consists of investing in 
production-related sectors during the winter and 
exposing their portfolio to consumer-related sectors 
during the summer. 
More recently Carrazedo, Curto & Oliveira (2016), 
Haggard & Witte (2010), Jacobsen & Zhang (2010) 
also documented the Halloween effect. Haggard & 
Witte (2010) Jacobsen & Zhang (2010) analyse 
monthly return seasonality using 300 years of UK stock 
market data (1693-2009) and conclude that the 
Halloween effect is robust over different subsample 
periods. They examined whether summer returns are 
consistently lower than the risk-free rate and came up 
with a negative summer risk premium for 201 of the 
317 years in their sample. Additionally, they also show 
that trading rules based on the Halloween effect beat 
the market more than 80% of the time over 5-year 
horizons. Carrazedo et al. (2016) present economically 
and statistically empirical evidence that the Halloween 
effect is significant. Moreover, a trading strategy based 
on this anomaly works persistently and outperforms the 
buy-and-hold strategy in 8 out of 10 indices in their 
sample. The authors suggest that a possible 
explanation for the Halloween effect may be related to 
negative average returns during the May–October 
period, rather than superior performance during the 
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November–April period. Urquhart & McGroarty (2014) 
also found calendar anomalies suggesting that Against 
the Halloween strategy, are, for example, the findings 
of Maberly and Pierce (2004), Lucey and Zhao (2008) 
and Dichlt & Drobetz (2015). Maberly & Pierce (2004) 
concluded that the anomaly identified in the U.S. equity 
returns (from April 1982 through April 2003) is due to 
the presence of two outliers in their sample: “the large 
monthly declines for October 1987 and August 1998 
associated with the stock market crash and collapse of 
the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, 
respectively” (Maberly and Pierce, 2004 p. 43). 
Furthermore, they found that the effect disappears after 
data adjustment. Lucey and Zhao (2008) concluded 
that the Halloween effect presented by Bouman and 
Jacobsen (2002) might not exist, being no more than a 
reflection of the January effect. Contrary to Bouman 
and Jacobsen’s (2002) results, they saw that the 
Halloween strategy is not demonstrably more profitable 
than the buy-and-hold strategy. More recently, Dichlt & 
Drobetz (2015) found that the Halloween effect strongly 
weakened or even disappeared in recent years. They 
argue that their results are robust across different 
markets and against various parameter variations. 
Overall, their findings support the theory of efficient 
capital markets. 
Therefore, and based on this brief literature review, 
we can conclude that there is no consensus regarding 
the existence of such anomaly, nor about the causes of 
this effect, if it exists. The million-dollar question 
remains: Can an investor get higher profits without 
taking higher risks? 
This paper adds to the existing literature by testing 
the existence of the Halloween effect in the European 
Equity Mutual Funds industry based on a sample of 
145 funds and data from 1997 to 2013. Its contribution 
to the Halloween effects literature is threefold. First, it 
focuses on European Equity Mutual Funds. As far as 
we know, the Halloween effect has not yet been 
studied on European euro currency denominated 
Equity Mutual Funds. Second, we show that the 
January effect does not explain this anomaly. Finally, 
we document that the Halloween effect became 
statistically insignificant, but stills economically 
significant, after Bouman and Jacobsen’s (2002) 
publication. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes 
the data, the methodology used and reports the 
empirical results. Section 3 tests their robustness and 
documents the existence of the Halloween effect. 
Finally, Section 4 summarises our concluding remarks. 
2. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS 
In this section, we present data that supports our 
empirical study, and we discuss the methodology used 
to test the Halloween effect. The main empirical results 
are also reported in this section. 
2.1. Data 
In the empirical analysis, we select 145 funds that 
invest in equities through European countries and that 
manage a minimum of 500 million Euros in assets. The 
main reason for considering European funds is that 
seasonal effects (especially the Halloween effect) are 
little known in Europe when compared to American 
countries, and there are only a few studies about 
European stock market funds. For example, Andreu, 
Ortiz and Sarto (2013) examine the seasonal patterns 
of 69 individual pension plans monthly returns 
commercialised in Spain and investing in Eurozone 
equities from 2001 to 2009. Consistent with existing 
literature, results indicate that a set of portfolios obtain 
levels of performance during certain months, especially 
December, that are significantly different from the rest. 
Table 1: Reports the descriptive statistics based on monthly returns of the funds: average, standard deviation, 
median, minimum and maximum returns. Statistical information is reported for small, mid and large-cap 
funds and growth, blend and value strategy funds. 
Size Style 
 Total 
Small Mid Large Growth Blend Value 
Number of Funds 145 7 63 75 20 98 27 
Average Returns 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 
St. Deviation 5.6% 6.0% 5.5% 5.6% 5.5% 5.5% 5.9% 
Median 0.9% 1.2% 0.7% 1.0% 1.1% 0.8% 1.0% 
Minimum -183.9% -25.0% -61.3% -183.9% -25.0% -183.9% -25.1% 
Maximum 71.8% 27.0% 71.8% 31.7% 27.0% 71.8% 29.8% 
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To study the Halloween effect in European Equities 
Mutual Funds, we start with monthly price returns over 
the period 1997-2013. We construct a dataset of 
monthly returns on 145 mutual funds using Net Asset 
Value (NAV) data collected from Bloomberg. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics, based on monthly 
logarithmic returns of the fund’s NAV for the total and 
segmented by investment strategy characteristics, size 
and style. 
From the analysis of our sample, we observe that 
differences between summer and winter average 
returns are in general large. In most funds, returns over 
the summer tend to be negative or close to zero, as 
Figure 1 suggests. 
2.2. Funds Average Return 
To guarantee that the better performance of winter 
months is not related to a riskier period, we have also 
analysed the standard deviation, which, as Figure 2 
shows (based on dispersion above and down the X-
axis), is similar for both periods for the majority of the 
analysed funds. 
2.3. Average Returns and Risk 
This figure reports the average returns and the 
standard deviation for each of the 145 funds investing 
in European equities over the period 1997-2013 during 
the summer (May-October) and during the winter 
(November-April). 
 
Figure 1: reports the average returns for each of the 145 funds investing in European equities over the period 1997-2013 during 
the summer (May-October) and during the winter (November-April). 
 
 
Figure 2: Reports the average returns for each fund, in the vertical axis, and the standard deviation, in the horizontal axis, 
during the Summer (May-October) and during the Winter (November-April) over the period 1997-2013. 
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2.4. Methodology 
Fund performance in this study was measured 
through monthly logarithmic returns defined as; 
R
t
= ln
P
t
P
t
!1
"
#$
%
&'
           (1) 
where Pt is the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV) on the 
last trading day of the month t and Pt-1 is the fund’s 
NAV on the last trading day of the previous month. To 
test the existence of Halloween effect, and to be 
consistent with the Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) 
approach, we use the following simple linear regression 
equation: 
R
t
=! + "D
H
+ #
t
          (2) 
where D
H
 is a dummy variable, !  and !  are 
parameters, is the continuously compounded return 
and !
t
 is the usual error term2 !t = Rt " Et"1 Rt( ) , and 
 
!t ! N 0," 3
2( ) . 
The variable DH is the Halloween dummy that 
equals 1 if the month t falls in the period November 
through April and takes the value 0 in the period May 
through October. Thus, the constant !  represents the 
average return for the May-Octoberperiod, when the 
variable DH takes the value 0, and the coefficient 
estimate !  represents the difference between the 
average returns for the two periods November-April 
and May-October. If a Halloween effect is present, we 
expect the estimate for the coefficient !  to be 
statistically different from zero. To estimate the 
parameters !  and ! , we use the Ordinary Least 
Squares method (OLS). 
2.5. Results 
Table 2 reports the results for the annualised 
average returns, annualised standard errors and 
general conclusions from the seasonality test specified 
by the regression in Equation (2). 
There is a statistically significant Halloween effect 
on 120 of the 145 funds in our sample, at the 10 
                                            
2 In order to deal with errors of non-sphericity we apply the OLS coefficients 
standard error corrections. White (1980) procedures are applied in cases of 
heteroscedasticity and Newey and West (1987) procedures in cases of both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation or only autocorrelation. 
percent significance level, and in 101 funds at the 5 
percent level. Moreover, we have also seen that, in 139 
funds, the return during winter is greater than that in 
summer, and only at the 10 percent level is it possible 
to identify a fund with a positive and significant summer 
average return. 
As presented in Subsection 2.1, returns tend to be 
below average (and negative) in all summer months, 
especially in August and September, while winter 
month returns tend to be positive and higher. 
Table 2: Shows the average and the standard deviation 
(between parenthesis) of the estimated 
parameters α and β , for the linear regression 
presented in Equation 2 (first 2 rows), these 
figures are annualized; The number of funds to 
which each null hypothesis was rejected for 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels is 
split by number of funds with a positive sign 
(+) and number of funds with a negative sign  
(–) for the estimates of the parameters α and β 3 
α(σα)  -0.0465 (0.0106) 
β(σβ)  0.2030 (0.0228) 
Number of funds  
Reject α=0 at 10% 1+ 1- 
Reject α=0 at 5% 0+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 1% 0+ 0- 
Funds with α>0 19 
Reject β=0 at 10% 120+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 5% 101+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 1% 26+ 0- 
Funds with β>0 140 
Number of funds with β>α 139 
 
2.6. Halloween Effect Statistical Significance 
We have just tested whether average returns during 
the winter are higher than during the summer. A 
discussion point worth analysing is whether the 
difference between these periods is due to the 
performance of specific months rather than that of the 
whole period. 
 
                                            
3 In Table 2 the interior grid line that separates the numbers should be 
removed. 
6     The Open Journal of Economics & Finance, 2017, Vol. 1 José, et al. 
The January effect is an anomaly of stock prices 
behaviour identified as a positive abnormal return 
between 31st December and the end of the first week of 
January. For that reason, higher returns during winter 
months could merely be due to the January effect. To 
discard that possibility, we test whether the Halloween 
effect is in fact due to the January effect. To do so, we 
run Equation (3) which considers an additional dummy 
variable. 
Rt =! + "1Dadj + "2Dadj + #t          (3) 
Where, Djan, is the additional dummy variable which 
takes the value 1 in January and 0 otherwise to control 
the Halloween effect for the well-known January effect. 
The dummy variable for the Halloween effect, denoted 
by Dadj, is now adjusted, so that it takes the value 1 in 
the November to Aprilperiod, except in January, and 0 
in May to October. Table 3 summarizes the results. 
2.7. Halloween Effect Statistical Significance 
Controlled for the January Effect 
We found that the Halloween effect is still present in 
most of the funds: 119 of the 120 funds where we 
previously found a significant Halloween effect  
(Table 2). The January effect is only statistically 
significant and positive for 29 funds. 
Therefore, we reject the hypothesis that the 
Halloween effect is due to the January effect. 
Moreover, we can say that, for most funds, the January 
effect is not present in our sample although, from our 
analysis in Subsection 2.3, we saw that returns seem 
to vary in different months, thus demonstrating the 
need to test whether this difference is statistically 
significant. 
The parametric F test examines the joint 
significance of the estimates for all the twelve months 
via the following equation: 
R
t
=!1 +!2D2t +!3D3t + ...+ !12D12t + "t        (4) 
As defined before, R
t
 is the continuously 
compounded return, and !t = Rt " Et"1 Rt( ) . Each Dit  is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for month i 
and 0 otherwise, !1  is the average return for January 
and ! i  is the coefficient for month i, which represents 
the difference between January returns and returns in 
other months. If returns for each month are similar we 
expect that ! i , where i goes from 2 to 12, are jointly 
insignificant, which means that in the global model 
significance test, we will not reject the null hypothesis 
which consists: 
H0 :!2 =!3 = ...=!11 =!12 = 0  
In line with what Jacobsen and Zhang (2010) 
reported in their results, our analysis indicates that 
there are statistically significant differences between 
months for some funds. However, this test does not 
clarify which months contribute for this seasonality. To 
do so, we will estimate the following regression for 
each month: 
Rt =! + "Dit + #t           (5) 
where Di  is the dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if t falls in the month i, and takes the value 0 otherwise. 
Table 3: This table shows the average of the estimated 
parameters ! , !1  and !2  as well as the 
average standard error (between parenthesis) 
for the regression presented in Equation 3 
(first three rows), both statistics are 
annualized; The number of funds to which 
each null hypothesis was rejected for the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels is split by number of 
funds with a positive sign (+) and number of 
funds with a negative sign (-) for the estimates 
of the parameters ! , !1  and !2  
α(σα)  -0.0465 (0.0106) 
β1(σβ1)  0.2114 (0.0220) 
β2(σβ2)  0.1618 (0.0676) 
Number of funds  
Reject α=0 at 10% 1+ 1- 
Reject α=0 at 5% 0+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 1% 0+ 0- 
Funds with α>0 19 
  
Reject β1=0 at 10% 119+ 0- 
Reject β1=0 at 5% 106+ 0- 
Reject β1=0 at 1% 25+ 0- 
Funds with β1>0 140 
  
Reject β2=0 at 10% 29+ 1- 
Reject β2=0 at 5% 20+ 1- 
Reject β2=0 at 1% 5+ 1- 
Funds with β2>0 133 
Number of funds with β1>α 138 
Number of funds with β2>α 139 
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The coefficient α represents the expected return for 
months other than i and β is the accrual average return 
for month i when compared with the average return of 
the other months. The results are presented in Table 4. 
2.8. Differences in Monthly Average Returns 
Table 4 demonstrates that September returns are 
responsible for bad performance in average returns for 
108 funds, at the 10 percent level, and for 82 funds if 
we require a 5 percent level. Effectively, the lowest 
monthly average return is September; however, we 
were also expecting April to be a positively significant 
month, regarding average returns, which happens but 
only for 24 funds at the 10 percent level and that 
number falls to 4 if we require a 5 percent level. From 
the observation of Figure 3, the average returns during 
the winter are positive for each of the months in that 
period. Contrary to our expectations, returns are not 
unusually high in January but are in December and 
April, while returns during summer months are lower 
and particularly bad in August and September. 
Table 4: Shows the average of the estimated parameter β, as well as the average standard error (columns 2 and 3) for 
each month. Columns 4 to 7 present the number of funds to which we reject the null hypothesis that β is 0 at 
the 10% and 5% significance levels split by the respective sign 
      Reject β=0 
  β   σβ  10% level 5% level 
      β>0 β<0 β>0 β<0 
January 0.0052 0.0193 11 2 7 1 
February 0.0032 0.0082 0 2 0 1 
March 0.0037 0.0057 1 1 0 1 
April 0.0159 0.0082 24 0 4 0 
May -0.0056 0.0052 0 0 0 0 
June -0.0112 0.0066 0 3 0 2 
July 0.0019 0.0059 1 0 0 0 
August -0.0157 0.0079 0 24 0 3 
September -0.026 0.0105 0 108 0 82 
October 0.0061 0.0076 3 0 1 0 
November 0.0076 0.0087 1 1 0 1 
December 0.0147 0.0075 6 2 1 1 
 
 
Figure 3: Reports the average returns for each month. Black columns are related to months in the Summer and white columns 
are from months in the Winter. 
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2.9. Average Returns by Month 
Figure 3 reports the annualised average returns for 
each month. Black columns are related to winter 
months and white columns are related to summer 
months. 
3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, we will test if the Halloween effect is 
correctly identified. For that purpose, we will first 
analyse whether the Halloween effect is found in funds 
with different sizes and investment strategies. We will 
then test whether the anomaly is still significant when 
we use daily returns instead of monthly figures. 
Hereafter, we study if the Halloween effect is no more 
than a good performance during the last quarter of the 
year, October through December, or if it is due to a 
poor performance in the third quarter, July through 
September. 
It is important to test whether the anomaly is still 
present in the European Mutual Funds industry after 
the Bouman and Jacobsen publication in 2002. 
Otherwise, conclusions from this study could be 
wrongly assigned to the period from 1997 through 
2013, if the effect disappeared after 2002. The results 
appear in Subsection 3.4. 
Finally, in Subsection 3.5 we compare the 
performance of two investment strategies, one based 
on the “buy-and-hold” and the other based on the 
Halloween strategy, which is no more than investing in 
European Mutual Funds during the winter and investing 
in a risk-free asset during the summer. 
3.1. Size and Style Effects 
The first point to check is if the Halloween effect is 
present in all type of funds, regardless of fund size or 
investment style. We then split the funds in our sample 
by investments in companies’ size: small, mid or large 
cap; or by investment style: value, blend or growth. To 
better establish the distinction, we exclude the mid and 
the blend funds from this analysis. The results, 
obtained from the regression in Equation (2) are 
summarised in Table 5 and Table 6. 
3.2. Halloween Effect and Size Investment Effect 
Table 5, Panel A and Panel B, shows the results for 
large and small cap funds, respectively. The Halloween 
effect appears to be present in all the small-cap funds 
at 10 and 5 percent significance level, while it remains 
present in 5 of the 7 funds at the 1 percent significance 
level. For large cap funds, the Halloween effect is 
present in 49 of the 75 large cap funds at the 5 percent 
significance level. It is important to notice that returns 
Table 5: This table is divided into two panels. Panel A shows the Halloween effect tested for the large-cap funds, and 
Panel B shows the Halloween effect tested for the small cap funds. The first two rows in each panel present 
the average of the estimates for the parameters α  and β, both figures are annualized. The number of funds to 
which each null hypothesis was rejected for the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels is splited by the number of funds 
with a positive sign (+) and number of funds with a negative sign (-) for the estimates of the parameters  
α  and β 
Panel A: Large Cap Funds Panel B: Small Cap Funds 
α -0.0501  α -0.0710  
β 0.1899  β 0.3183  
Number of funds 75 Number of funds 7 
Reject α=0 at 10% 1+ 1- Reject α=0 at 10% 0+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 5% 0+ 0- Reject α=0 at 5% 0+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 1% 0+ 0- Reject α=0 at 1% 0+ 0- 
Funds with α>0 4 Funds with α>0 0 
    
Reject β=0 at 10% 63+ 0- Reject β=0 at 10% 7+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 5% 49+ 0- Reject β=0 at 5% 7+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 1% 6+ 0- Reject β=0 at 1% 5+ 0- 
Funds with β>0 73 Funds with β>0 7 
Number of funds with β>α 73 Number of funds with β>α 7 
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for 73 large cap funds are higher during the winter than 
during the summer and that returns during the summer 
are only positive (but not statistically significant at least 
at the 10 percent significance level) for 4 funds. 
3.3. Halloween Effect and the Style Investment 
Effect 
Table 6, Shows a similar summary of the analysis 
but this time for the value and growth strategy funds. 
Panel A reports the results for value style funds, and 
Panel B reports the results for growth style funds. For 
both investment styles, all the returns are higher during 
the winter than during the summer. Moreover, summer 
 
returns are positive (even though not statistically 
significant) for only one fund in each group. The 
Halloween anomaly is present in all the growth strategy 
funds at the 10 percent level and remains present in 
90% of the growth funds at the 5 percent level. 
From this analysis, we conclude that the Halloween 
effect appears to be equally present in small cap and 
large cap funds and value style and growth style funds, 
although it is important to state that, due to the small 
number of funds in each group, we cannot generalise 
these conclusions. 
 
Table 6:  This table is divided into two panels. Panel A shows the Halloween effect tested for the value style funds, 
and Panel B shows the Halloween effect tested for the growth style funds. The first two rows in each panel 
present the average of the estimates of the parameters α and β, both figures are annualized. The number of 
funds to which each null hypothesis was rejected for the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels is split by the number of 
funds with a positive sign (+) and number of funds with a negative sign (-) for the estimates of the 
parameters α  and β 
Panel A: Value Style Funds Panel B: Growth Style Funds 
α -0.0530  α -0.0598  
β 0.2073  β 0.2524  
Number of funds 27 Number of funds 20 
Reject α=0 at 10% 0+ 1- Reject α=0 at 10% 0+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 5% 0+ 0- Reject α=0 at 5% 0+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 1% 0+ 0- Reject α=0 at 1% 0+ 0- 
Funds with α>0 1 Funds with α>0 1 
    
Reject β=0 at 10% 21+ 0- Reject β=0 at 10% 20+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 5% 17+ 0- Reject β=0 at 5% 18+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 1% 3+ 0- Reject β=0 at 1% 7+ 0- 
Funds with β>0 27 Funds with β>0 20 
Number of funds with β>α 27 Number of funds with β>α 7 
Table 7: Shows the average of the estimated parameters α and β  of the regression Equation 2 (rows 1 and 2) using 
daily returns, figures are annualized; The number of funds to which each null hypothesis was rejected for the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels is split in number of funds with a positive sign (+) and number of funds with a 
negative sign (-) for the estimates of the parameters α and β. The results for monthly returns were presented 
in Table 2 and are repeated here for comparisons 
  Daily Returns Monthly Returns 
α -0.0022 -0.0465 
β 0.0086 0.2030 
Number of funds   
Reject α=0 at 10% 2+ 4- 1+ 1- 
Reject α=0 at 5% 1+ 0- 0+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 1% 0+ 0- 0+ 0- 
   
Reject β=0 at 10% 106+ 0- 120+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 5% 61+ 0- 101+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 1% 26+ 0- 26+ 0- 
     
Number of funds with β>α 139 139 
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3.4. Daily Frequency 
Another important issue to investigate is whether we 
still find a statistically significant Halloween effect if the 
data frequency of the observations is reduced, i.e. if we 
use daily prices instead of monthly prices. In the 
current section, we repeat the test for the presence of 
the Halloween effect using regression Equation (2). 
Results for daily prices are slightly different from 
those presented in Table 2. In Table 7, the average 
estimates of α and β  are now closer to 0, but we still 
have a negative value for the average α and a positive 
value for the average β. As for the Halloween effect, we 
see that it is now statistically significant at the 10 
percent level for 106 funds, 14 funds fewer than before, 
although at the 5 percent level we “lose” 40 funds with 
the change on data frequency. 
3.5. Halloween Effect Statistical Significance Using 
Daily Observations 
Table 7, Shows the average of the estimated 
parameters α and β    of the regression Equation 2 (rows 
1 and 2) using daily returns, figures are annualized; 
The number of funds to which each null hypothesis was 
rejected for the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels is split in 
number of funds with a positive sign (+) and number of 
funds with a negative sign (-) for the estimates of the 
parameters α and β. The results for monthly returns 
were presented in Table 2 and are repeated here for 
comparisons. 
3.6. Recovery of the Performance 
Doeswijk (2009) argues that funds managers try to 
beat the benchmark in the winter months, in order to 
close the year with better results. The monthly analysis, 
in Subsection 2.3, indicates that returns are generally 
high in last quarter of the year. An interesting analysis 
would be to check whether these three months are 
indeed responsible for the winter performance. To test 
this, we will follow the usual approach and consider a 
new equation similar to the one of Equation (2): 
Rt =! + "DQ4 + #t           (6) 
As usual, R
t
 is the continuously compounded 
return and !t = Rt " Et"1 Rt( ).DQ4  is the dummy variable 
that takes the value 1 for October, November and 
December and 0 otherwise, β is the coefficient estimate 
that represents the difference between the average 
returns and the returns in the fourth quarter. Table 8 
provides the results. 
3.7. Influence of the Fourth Quarter in the Overall 
Performance 
From the results reported in Table 8, we can see 
that the fourth quarter performance is statistically 
significant and positive for about 42% of the funds at 
the 10 percent significance level. However, that value 
falls to only 17% if we consider a 5 percent level. It 
seems unreliable that the fourth quarter performance is 
responsible for the higher winter returns. 
Table 8: Shows the average of the estimated parameters α  and β, as well as the average standard error for the 
regression in Equation 6 (first two rows), figures are annualized; The number of funds to which each null 
hypothesis was rejected for the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels is split by number of funds with a positive sign (+) 
and number of funds with a negative sign (-) for the estimates of the parameters α  and β 
α(σα)  0.0102 (0.0118) 
β(σβ)  0.1490 (0.0246) 
Number of funds  
Reject α=0 at 10% 10+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 5% 9+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 1% 4+ 0- 
Funds with α>0 80 
  
Reject β=0 at 10% 62+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 5% 23+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 1% 1+ 0- 
Funds with β>0 133 
Number of funds with β>α 127 
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Based on the analysis of the fourth quarter 
performance, we can also test whether lower summer 
returns are due to the underperformance in the third 
quarter. We then repeat the previous test for Q3 
instead of Q4. The results are reported in Table 9. 
Table 9: Looks only for the third quarter performance in 
the overall performance and shows the 
average of the estimated parameters α and β, 
as well as the average standard deviation for 
the regression in Equation 6 (rows 1-2), figures 
are annualized; The number of funds to which 
each null hypothesis was rejected for the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels is split by number of 
funds with a positive sign(+) and number of 
funds with a negative sign(–) for the estimates 
of the parameters α and β 
α(σα)  0.0979 (0.0111) 
β(σβ)  -0.1767 (0.0253) 
Number of funds  
Reject α=0 at 10% 97+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 5% 61+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 1% 12+ 0- 
Funds with α>0 143 
  
Reject β=0 at 10% 1+ 114- 
Reject β=0 at 5% 0+ 88- 
Reject β=0 at 1% 0+ 9- 
Funds with β>0 7 
   
Number of funds with β<α 139 
 
3.8. Influence of the Third Quarter in the Overall 
Performance 
We see now that returns in the third quarter are 
responsible for the poor performance of about 79% of 
the funds, and returns in Q3 are lower than during the 
remaining period of the year for about 96% of the 
funds. 
3.9. The Halloween effect after Bouman and 
Jacobsen (2002) publication 
The Halloween effect received a lot of media 
attention after the publication of Bouman and 
Jacobsen’s (2002) paper, as it was the first time that 
such anomaly had been studied in depth. According to 
Murphy’s Law, after an anomaly is discovered, it should 
disappear or reverse itself. In order to discover if the 
anomaly had disappeared or reversed itself after the 
Bouman and Jacobsen study, we split the total period 
of our analysis (1997-2013) into the following sub-
periods: before the publication of the study in 
December 2002 (1997-2002); after the publication of 
the study and before the crisis (2003-2007); after the 
publication of the study and during the international 
financial crisis4 (2008-2013). Before moving to the 
regression analysis, we study the difference between 
winter and summer returns in those three above 
mentioned periods. Figure 4 shows the statistical main 
                                            
4 The onset of the financial crisis is generally accepted to be late July 2007. In 
July, 2007, the Fed and the Bank of England provided the first large 
emergency loan to banks, in response to increasing pressures on the interbank 
market. 
 
Figure 4: Shows the box plot of the differences between the winter and summer returns for the 145 funds. We present the 
minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile and maximum of the differences for the three periods: 1997-2002, 2003-2007 
and 2008-2013. 
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characteristics of the differences between the winter 
and summer returns in each of the above-mentioned 
periods. 
3.10. Differences between the Winter and Summer 
Returns 
In Figure 4, we can see that, in the 1997-2002 
period, the 75th percentile was about 2.2%. After the 
publication of Bouman and Jacobsen’s paper and 
before the 2008 crisis it falls to 0.5%, while during the 
crisis it rises to 1.3%. 
 
3.11. Halloween Effect Before and After the 
Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) Study 
While before the Bouman and Jacobsen publication, 
in 2002, winter returns were slightly different than 
summer returns, it looks like that, after 2002, those 
differences disappear, and winter returns are now 
similar to summer returns. 
To check whether our suspicions are correct, we 
now consider the usual regression defined in Equation 
(2) for the periods 1997-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-
2013. Table 10 summarises the results. During the 
1997-2002 period and at 5 percent significance level, 
Table 10: Shows the Average of the Estimated Parameters α and β, for the Regression in Equation 2 (First Two Rows) 
for the Period 1997-2002 (Column 2), 2003-2007 (Column 2) and for 2008-2013 (Column 4), Figures are 
Annualized; The Number of Funds to which each Null Hypothesis was Rejected for the 1, 5 and 10 Percent 
Levels is Split in Number of Funds with a Positive Sign (+) and Number of Funds with a Negative Sign (-) for 
the Estimates of the Parameters α  and β  
 1997-2002 2003-2007 2008-2013 
α -0.0076 0.0050 -0.0516 
β 0.0189 0.0032 0.0715 
Number of funds    
Reject α=0 at 10% 3+ 32- 25+ 0- 1+ 1- 
Reject α=0 at 5% 2+ 14- 15+ 0- 1+ 0- 
Reject α=0 at 1% 2+ 5- 6+ 0- 1+ 0- 
    
Reject β=0 at 10% 128+ 0- 10+ 0- 0+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 5% 119+ 0- 9+ 0- 0+ 0- 
Reject β=0 at 1% 47+ 0- 4+ 0- 0+ 0- 
Number of funds with β>α 140 27 135 
 
 
Figure 5: Reports the average returns for each of the 145 funds during the summer (May-October) and the winter (November-
April). Data presented in this figure is over the 2008-2013period. 
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we found the Halloween effect to be present in 128 
funds, although during the 2003-2007 period that 
anomaly is present in only 10 funds and seems to 
disappear after 2008. Moreover, in the 1997-2002 
period, the estimate for α is statistically significant and 
negative for 32 funds, at the 10 percent level but that 
significance disappears after Bouman and Jacobsen’s 
(2002) publication. These results tell us that summer 
risk premium might not be negative after the publication 
and summer returns are now much closer to winter 
returns, as we have seen before. Therefore, the 
Halloween effect became statistically insignificant after 
the publication of Bouman and Jacobsen’s paper, 
although we cannot say that it is no longer 
economically significant, as suggested in Figure 5. 
3.12. Funds’ Average Return in Summer and Winter 
Over 2008-2013 
Looking at Figure 6 becomes clear that summer 
average returns are generally positive but lower than 
winter average returns. If we look in more detail, we will 
see that monthly returns before and after 2002 are 
slightly different. 
3.13. Average Returns before and after Bouman 
and Jacobsen’s (2002) 
If we can clearly identify the presence of the 
Halloween effect in the period before the Bouman and 
Jacobsen publication, after 2002 and before the crisis, 
average monthly returns are always positive. During 
the crisis, after July 2007, we see some differences in 
monthly returns but cannot identify any standard 
pattern. 
3.14.Trading Strategies 
It would be interesting to study how a trading 
strategy based on the Halloween effect would perform 
in comparison to a simple buy-and-hold strategy. Many 
economists argue that it is not possible to maximise 
profits using anomalies like the Halloween effect and 
that it only exists in the academic world. 
For the purpose of studying the strategy based on 
the Halloween anomaly, we define two investment 
strategies: the buy-and-hold strategy and the 
Halloween strategy. For the buy-and-hold strategy, we 
assume that the investor holds the portfolio for the 
 
Figure 6: Reports the average returns for each month before (1997-2002) and after the Bouman and Jacobsen publication. 
Columns in grey are referring to Summer months (May to October) and columns in black are referring to Winter months 
(November to April). 
 
Table 11: Shows the Percentage of Funds in which the Halloween Strategy Bets the Buy-and-Hold Strategy, for the 
Return and for the Reward-to-Risk Ratio and Split by Period. For Example, This Table Reports that in the 
Period 1997-2002, the Halloween Strategy has Out performed the Buy-and-Hold Strategy in 99% of the Funds 
in Our Sample 
Percentage of Funds in which the Halloween Strategy Beats the Buy-and-Hold Strategy 
 
1997-2013 1997-2002 2003-2007 2008-2013 
          
Return 99% 99% 7% 99% 
          
Reward-to-Risk ratio 93% 97% 99% 99% 
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entire period. For the Halloween strategy, we assume 
that the investor buys a portfolio at the end of October 
and sells that portfolio at the end of April, the investor 
then invests in a risk-free asset from the end of April 
through the end of October. The risk-free rate used 
corresponds to the continuously-compounded 
Interbank Rate: the Libor ECU 6 months, from October 
1997 to December 1998, and the Euribor 6 months, 
from January 1999 to October 20135. 
Table 11 reports the percentage of funds where the 
Halloween strategy beats the buy-and-hold strategy in 
two characteristics: (i) return, percentage of funds in 
which the Halloween strategy outperformed the buy-
and-hold strategy; (ii) reward-to-risk ratio, percentage 
of funds in which the reward-to-risk ratio of the 
Halloween strategy was greater than the reward-to-risk 
ratio of the buy-and-hold strategy. 
3.15. Halloween Strategy Versus Buy-and-Hold 
Strategy 
During the period 1997-2013, the Halloween 
strategy outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy in 
about 99% of the funds. This contradicts financial 
principals stating that investors can get higher returns 
if, and only if, they take greater risks. During the period 
1997-2002, our results are in line with those of Bouman 
and Jacobsen (2002) who found that the Halloween 
strategy beats the buy-and-hold strategy for about 90% 
                                            
5 To save space, the results (annualized returns, standard deviation and 
reward-to-risk ratio) for both strategies and for each fund are not reported here 
but are available upon request. 
of the countries in their study. Moreover, our results 
support also those presented by Carrazedo et al. 
(2016). The authors point out, in their Scenario 2, that 
in 76% of the indices studied (96% if one considers 
only the Eurozone indices) the Halloween effect beats 
the buy-and-hold strategy. Figure 7 
3.16. Cumulative Wealth for the Two Investment 
Strategies 
After the analysis of the trading strategies, where 
we concluded that average monthly returns are always 
positive over the period 2003-2007, we were not 
expecting the Halloween strategy to beat the buy-and-
hold strategy; this only happens with 7% of the funds. 
Curiously, during the crisis period, 2007-2013, the 
percentage of funds that the Halloween strategy beats 
the buy-and-hold strategy, rises again to 99%. 
The Halloween strategy seems to be an alternative 
way to deal with this market anomaly, at least it was 
before the Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) publication. 
According to our analysis, the Halloween strategy 
beats the buy-and-hold strategy in only 56% of the 
funds for the entire period after the Bouman and 
Jacobsen (2002) publication, 2003-2013. 
As we show in Subsections 2.3 and 3.3, lower 
summer returns identified at the beginning of the study 
are no longer negative after 2002, and in some cases, 
they are even greater than winter returns. Therefore, it 
seems obvious that, after 2002, the summer risk 
premium became positive for most of the funds and the 
Halloween strategy can no longer beat the buy-and-
hold strategy, at least with any degree of certainty.  
 
Figure 7: Reports the cumulative wealth for the buy-and-hold strategy (dotted line) and the Halloween strategy (black line), 
assuming that investors hold equal weights of all the funds in the sample. 
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While initially, we thought that the Halloween 
strategy was an opportunity to avoid the lower returns 
from the Halloween effect, we now demonstrate that it 
is not clear that this strategy is still an exploitable 
opportunity after 2002. 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The “Sell in May and go away” is an old adage that 
tells us that returns are greater during the months of 
November to April (winter) than during May to October 
(summer) period. This paper studied the so-called 
Halloween effect market anomaly in European Equity 
Mutual Funds following the publication of Bouman and 
Jacobsen’s (2002) paper. 
We used monthly logarithmic returns of 145 
different sized Equity Mutual Funds that employed 
different investment strategies in Europe. Data in our 
sample covered the period from 1997 to 2013. 
Our first conclusion is that the Halloween effect was 
economically significant in 139 of the 145 funds in our 
sample. Secondly, another important point is that 
mutual funds returns during the six-month period from 
May to October are, on average, close to zero or even 
negative, while winter returns are unusually large. This 
anomaly goes against the EMH that market returns 
should not be predictably negative. 
Thirdly, we conclude that the Halloween effect is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level for 120 of 
the 145 funds in our sample, which means that there 
are statistically significant differences between winter 
and summer average returns and that winter returns 
are higher than summer returns. It is also important to 
note that we arrived at similar conclusions when we 
repeated the regression analysis with daily returns. 
Fourthly, we reject the hypothesis that the 
Halloween effect is explained by the January effect; 
neither did we find the January effect present in the 
European Equity Mutual Funds. Another interesting 
conclusion is that the Halloween effect is not explained 
by better performance during winter but rather by a 
poor performance during the third quarter of the year, 
thus explaining the anomaly. We found this explanation 
valid for 114 of the 120 funds where the anomaly was 
identified. 
The fifth conclusion came from the analysis of the 
investment strategies: the first based on the Halloween 
effect and the second based on the buy-and-hold 
strategy. Regarding average returns, the Halloween 
strategy outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy in 144 
funds and, regarding the reward-to-risk, in 135 funds 
the ratio is higher for the Halloween strategy than for 
the buy-and-hold strategy. Therefore, the Halloween 
strategy is an exploitable opportunity. 
One important point that we cover in this article is 
that if the Halloween effect became statistically 
insignificant after the publication of Bouman and 
Jacobsen’s (2002) paper, is market efficiency working? 
Although we would like to say yes, the Halloween effect 
remained economically significant after the start of the 
Euro crisis in the second half of 2007, which indicates 
that it still represents an exploitable opportunity. 
Our findings suggest that the Halloween effect is 
present in European Equity Mutual Funds and a 
strategy based on this anomaly provides abnormal 
profits. We also suggest that the negative returns 
during the summer months, which are primarily during 
the third quarter, might be one of the explanations for 
this calendar anomaly; however, further research might 
be needed. 
The EMH has over a century of history; however, no 
one knows the answer to the question: “Are stock 
markets efficient?” We have developed the study of the 
Halloween effect and pointed in different directions that 
may lead to the puzzle being solved. 
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